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ANALYSIS
Ukraine’s Vendée War? 
A Look at the “Resistance Identity” of the Donbass Insurgency
Bruno De Cordier, Ghent
The reactionary sympathizes with today’s revolutionary, 
for the latter embodies the vengeance on the one of yesterday. 
Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913–1994)
Abstract
The driving forces behind the insurgency in Donetsk and Lugansk go well beyond the clichés of Moscow-
backed separatism, cynical geostrategic calculations and the quest for natural resources. There are also psy-
chological factors, including the perception that a society and way of life are under threat. This article exam-
ines the different components of the ideological framework and the “resistance identity” of the insurgents in 
southeastern Ukraine: the Donbass identity, the legacies of the USSR, the Great Patriotic War and anti-fas-
cism, Orthodox Christianity, the freemen identity of the steppe of Novorossiia, and anti-colonial resistance.
Survival and Colliding Social Orders
In some ways, the Donbass insurgency, which is now 
in its third year, recalls the War of the Vendée, which 
took place in post-revolutionary France between spring 
1793 and early 1796. Of course, wholesale compari-
son between these two episodes makes no sense at all, 
given the differences in historical circumstances, causes 
and local conditions. Nonetheless, the often-misun-
derstood nature of the Vendée, along with the massive 
displacement and humanitarian impact the rebellion 
and repression had, are most instructive. For a  start, 
the counter-revolutionary movement went well-beyond 
ignorant Catholic peasants, manipulated or coerced by 
the clergy and nobility who resented the loss of prop-
erty, status and privileges, rising up against represent-
atives and supporters of the republican regime in Paris.
The Jacobin post-revolutionary order was indeed felt, 
among wide sectors of the grassroots and some provin-
cial elites, to be an existential threat to traditional iden-
tities, ways of life and habits of regional independence 
that co-existed with a certain loyalty to the deposed 
monarchy.1 The post-revolutionary reforms and redis-
tribution of resources mainly benefited a minority of 
town bourgeoisie rather than the majority peasant pop-
ulation. The last straw was the military draft. Although 
nobles and guild masters headed guerrilla units, it was 
essentially a popular movement. More than a progres-
sive republican government facing a reactionary back-
lash, the Vendée War grew out of a collision of opposing 
societal and civilizational aspirations and different inter-
1 For an in-depth examination of the causes and motivations of the 
Vendée War, see Jean-Clément Martin, ‘La Vendée et sa guerre, 
les logiques de l’évènement’, Annales, Economies, Sociétés et 
Civilisations, 40(5), 1985, S. 1067–1085 and Tobias Birzer, ‘L' in-
explicable Vendée’. Gegenrevolutionärer Aufstand und Bürgerkrieg 
in Westfrankreich 1793–1796, München: GRIN-Verlag, 2003.
pretations of freedom. Its main lesson is that emancipa-
tory ideals—no matter whether these are being pushed 
through subtly or with a heavy hand—are often expe-
rienced as destructive by the very populations one seeks 
to “emancipate” and “enlighten.”
This specific aspect bears relevance in assessing the 
events in Donetsk and Lugansk. If the insurgency indeed 
was really a matter of Moscow-backed mercenaries who 
terrorize the population for the sake of the cynical inter-
ests of organized crime, regional oligarchs, or Ukraine’s 
former president, or a mere matter of obtaining more 
resources, without any locally-rooted support, ideologi-
cal narrative and sincere faith in a societal project, then 
it would most likely have wound down long ago. It is 
not even relevant that the parts of Donetsk and Lugansk 
which are not under the control of the Ukrainian gov-
ernment and its affiliates are allegedly a closed informa-
tion environment—an information environment cannot 
be hermetically sealed these days. The war, its humani-
tarian consequences and its psychological impact are at 
a point where the identity questions and sociological 
differences that were already present in Ukraine have 
been driven beyond the point where it would be feasi-
ble to psychologically reintegrate the affected regions.
The Donbass Identity
So, if there is indeed an identity and a societal concept 
that are being defended by the insurgents against exter-
nal aggression and existential threats, then what are 
their components and characteristics? Of course, the 
personal motivations and the degree of ideological con-
sciousness among the fighters and the formal and infor-
mal leadership of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics 
vary widely. But if one analyzes the discourse, symbols 
and iconography, and the propagandistic materials of 
the insurgents, one sees, in my opinion, an ideological 
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narrative crystallized around six components. To start 
with, what began as local protests against rumored plans 
to cancel the language law and revoke the recognition 
of Russian and other minority languages, has become 
a fight mobilized around what one could call the spirit 
of Donbass, the area roughly situated between Lugansk 
and the Sea of Azov.
This Donbass spirit, the first of the six components, 
refers to a certain type of person who has long been 
present in this old industrial basin. One spiritual aspect 
often referred to is the tradition of restiveness rooted in 
the history of the region, which was originally a steppe 
inhabited by Turkic nomads like the Kuman and Kipçak, 
and served as a refuge for Slavic dissenters. The Lugansk 
area, for instance, attracted proto-Ukrainian population 
groups fleeing Polish rule during Bogdan Chmelnitski’s 
Cossack rebellion between 1648 and 1654. After 1685, 
large groups of schismatic Orthodox Old Believers, fac-
ing persecution and driven by an eschatological belief in 
nearby end times, settled into what was then the wider 
periphery of the greater Russian space. A portion of what 
is now southeastern Ukraine was also long part of the 
free territories of the Don Cossacks. The region’s present 
sociological identity, however, was formed by its grad-
ual industrialization which started after coal fields were 
first discovered in 1720. It gained momentum during 
the major industrialization drive in coal mining, met-
allurgy and transport industries and the arrival of inter-
national capital between 1860 and 1890.
As one of the industrial heartlands of imperial 
Russia and later the USSR, it became an epicenter for 
a wide variety of labor and social movements, which 
later resulted, amongst others, in the creation of the 
ephemeral Donetsk-Krivoi Rog Soviet Republic—of 
which the present-day Donetsk republic uses the flag—
in 1918 and the Donbass mine strikes in the USSR in 
1989 and 1990. More importantly, for the advocates 
of a Donbass identity, it is the homeland of rough, but 
sincere and reliable, workers with a penchant for real 
labor rather than talk and hot air, and, as such, starkly 
opposed in lifestyle, attitudes and values, to the arrogant 
cosmopolitans and fickle “new economy” professional 
from Kyiv, and to the Central European from Galicia 
whose identity was formed by long association with the 
Habsburg and Polish spaces. The antipathy and social 
prejudice, by the way, is reciprocal, with Donbass people 
being depicted as hillbillies and proles unable to cope 
with globalization in the Europhile salons and cosmo-
politan hipster cafés.
Strongly connected to this is the feeling that the 
Donbass, where before the war much of Ukraine’s indus-
trial and mining capacity was situated and which consid-
erably contributed to the country’s economic regenera-
tion between 1997 and 2007, basically feeds the country. 
The people of Donbass have nothing to gain from inte-
gration into a European Union where old industrial 
areas and societies have been dismantled if not mar-
ginalized by (Western) Europe’s mine closures and de-
industrialization since the 1980s. Although Donbass was 
demographically Russianized between 1926 and 1959, 
or at least diversified with the transfer of non-Ukrain-
ian groups from other parts of the USSR to work in its 
industries, the current war is not considered to be an eth-
nic war between Ukrainians and Russians. As a matter 
of fact, many insurgent fighters and supporters them-
selves are (partly) of Ukrainian origin. It is rather a strug-
gle between a project of inclusive Donbass patriotism 
defined by multi-ethnicity, regional brotherhood, cer-
tain forms of social organization and the binding capac-
ity of the Russian language—which, according to official 
census data, is the mother tongue or at least every-day 
lingua franca of about two-thirds of the population in 
these two provinces—versus the exclusive ethnic nation-
alism of Western Ukraine.
Soviet Restorationism
The second major component of the Donbass resistance 
identity are memories about the social achievements and 
perceived social justice in the Soviet Union. This is not 
a matter of commitment to Marxist ideology or the polit-
ical leadership of the local communist parties among the 
insurgents. What is important here, is the idea of a great 
and strong fatherland, in which Donbass, as an indus-
trial heartland and historical proletarian center, occupied 
a special position out of which it drew confidence and 
a number of privileges. Belonging to an organic, Rus-
sian-dominated greater space, is considered to be a con-
dition for the survival of Donbass, both as an economic 
area and as a  social identity.2 Although private prop-
erty and market economics are recognized, the Don-
bass resistance identity and its mobilizing discourse also 
emphasize the imperative to re-habilitate the social-eco-
nomic role of the state as an emancipator of the people, 
and of state control over the key sectors of the Donbass 
economy, in stark opposition to Anglo-Saxon neo-lib-
eralism and market fundamentalism.
Besides that, the USSR is associated with social sta-
bility, income equality, low crime rates, well-developed 
social services, guaranteed employment, and strong 
human capital. Even if after the dismantling of the 
2 For a an examination of the role of industrialization in Don-
bass’ strong identification with the USSR, see Andrej Baranow 
(Андрей Баранов), “Политическая идентичность Ново-
россии: состояние и ресурсы конструирования”. Каспий-
ский регион: политика, экономика, культура. №2 (43), 2015, 
p 98–106.
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USSR and Ukrainian independence, a fair amount of the 
Donbass industry continued to function in the national 
and global economy under new ownership structures 
and under the new financial oligarchies, much of the 
Soviet Union’s social achievements did not. The period 
immediately following the demise of the Soviet Union 
was also a time of stark demographic decline for Don-
bass. In particular, between 1989 and 1998, the region 
lost over 1.5 million inhabitants due to economic emi-
gration, plummeting birth rates and the overall impact 
of social disintegration, all seen as an existential threat 
to Donbass’ social fiber and identity. The social and psy-
chological impact of the USSR’s disintegration clearly 
form a defining experience that has shaped the Don-
bass’s present identity.
The importance of the USSR, or at least a number 
of aspects and episodes of its history, for the ideologi-
cal framework of the Donbass resistance brings us to 
the third component, the Great Patriotic War (1941–
45) and its anti-fascist struggle. The insurgents see them-
selves as a new generation of men who take up the duty 
to defend the Donbass, in a line that includes the rev-
olutionaries of the Donetsk-Krivoi Rog Soviet Republic 
who fought Ukrainian nationalists, the anti-Bolshevik 
Don Cossacks and their German and Polish backers in 
1918, and, of course, the partisans who resisted the Nazi 
occupation of Donbass between October 1941 and Feb-
ruary 1943. As such, they connect with a remembrance 
culture of the Great Patriotic War still prevalent in the 
old USSR. In the insurgent’s view, Ukrainian nation-
alism and ultra-nationalism always flourished with the 
backing of foreign invaders and occupants.3
References are thereby made to the imperial-Ger-
man support to the Ukrainian Council Republic and 
then hetman Skoropadski’s Ukrainian State in 1917–18. 
However, an episode that especially underlines this point 
is the Galician-Ukrainian nationalist movements and 
auxiliary units who collaborated with the Nazi occu-
pation of Ukraine and Stepan Bandera’s declaration of 
Ukrainian independence in summer 1941. The “Ban-
derites,” Ukraine’s present-day ultra-nationalists who 
are present in the government and in the paramilitaries 
fighting the Donbass insurgents are perceived to be the 
direct heirs of the Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. The 
only difference now is, that they are no longer instru-
mental in German expansionism, but in an American 
and NATO takeover and occupation of the country 
and eventually of the Russian world. This explains the 
3 The emphasis on the fight against Ukrainian ultra-nationalism 
brought the Donbass cause some sympathy among ethnic minor-
ities in Western Ukraine, like the Ruthenians and Hungarians 
of Trans-Carpathia.
strong anti-Americanist and anti-NATO line of the 
Donbass insurgents.
Orthodoxy as Cultural Defense
The fourth component is Russian Orthodoxy. Russian 
Orthodox symbols appeared early in the insurgency and 
some Cossack units and factions like the Orthodox Army 
specifically refer to the religious character of the struggle. 
No matter the level of actual and everyday religious prac-
tice of the individual insurgents and their supporters, Rus-
sian Orthodoxy and the Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
Patriarchate are considered to be key components of the 
Russian identity and a binding agent of the Russian greater 
space of which Donbass is an inalienable part. Moreover, 
Orthodoxy is considered to be the custodian of traditional 
values and norms of family and social organization which 
have to be the base of society. As such, it is part of a cul-
tural defense against liberalism and against an emascu-
lated, vassalized and de-Christianized European Union.
Since the globalist liberals have vested interests in the 
destruction of Orthodox Christian civilization, the latter 
is under a multi-pronged assault by Protestant and Pente-
costal missionaries and various sects who have been active 
in many parts of the old USSR since the 1990s, foreign-
funded liberal “civil society,” orchestrated international 
gay and transgender campaigns, and military aggression 
against Serbia and the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia 
and now also against Donbass and against the Russian 
Orthodox in the rest of Ukraine. The fact that a number 
of leading personalities in the current Ukrainian govern-
ment and in the foreign-backed protest movement that 
brought it to power are (rumored to be) Protestants and 
Scientologists, confirms the destructive role of non-tradi-
tional faiths. Therefore Donbass is a frontline where the 
survival of a civilization and of true Christianity is at stake.
Civil War or Colonial War?
A fifth component, which surpasses the geographical limits 
of Donbass proper, is the frontier identity typical of “New 
Russia” and the “Wild Fields.” Historically, this refers to the 
sparsely-populated Kipçak steppe and the northern coast 
of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which were attached 
as a military frontier to the Russian greater space during 
the Russian-Ottoman war of 1768–74. The lands were sub-
sequently incorporated into the military Governorate of 
Novorossiisk, the territory of which eventually stretched 
all the way to the Dniestr and Bessarabia. Its ideological 
relevance is twofold. First, “New Russia” (“Новороссия” 
in Russian) refers to an area in southern and southeastern 
Ukraine going from Donbass all the way to Odessa and 
Transnistria, where the Russian element is well-present. 
These territories are eventually to form a confederation 
when the present Ukrainian state collapses.
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Second, the old Wild Fields are considered to be 
a part of the Russian world with a strong tradition of 
freemen and pioneers. Some parts of this region were 
already populated by Slavic groups like Cossacks, 
(proto-)Ukrainians and Old Believers before it was offi-
cially annexed by imperial Russia. The 18th century, how-
ever saw a more systematic Slavic population coloniza-
tion in order to demographically anchor this frontier in 
the Russian greater space. Contrary to many peasants in 
the Russian heartland, the settlers were mostly not serfs 
but free peasants. Cossack democratic self-governance, 
the peasant councils and the communal land ownership 
structures that existed are considered to be historical pre-
cedents and, once rehabilitated, building blocks for the 
non-liberal democracy some want to build in the region.
Last but not least is the conviction that the insurgents, 
their ideologues and the opinion makers favorable to them 
are not fighting a separatist, but a colonial war. This man-
ifests, first, in a strong stance against oligarchs—in the 
first place, but not exclusively, pro-governmental oligarchs 
and the oligarchs who were nominated official governors 
of the rebel provinces by the Ukrainian government—who 
merely sell out Ukraine and Donbass to foreign interests 
and demolished the social achievements of the Soviet times. 
Ukraine’s current government is seen as operating under 
the custodianship of the IMF, which aims to squander the 
country’s potential by turning it into a mere reservoir of 
cheap labor and into a colony of agro-industrial transna-
tionals and of the shale gas industry which vies for reserves 
that exist in the eastern part of the country. This, of course, 
includes the privatization and eventual dismantling of 
Donbass’ mining and industry sectors.4 Moreover, the war 
and so-called anti-terrorist operation against Donbass are 
seen as pretexts for physically and socially destroying the 
southeast, and subsequently granting its reconstruction to 
foreign and regime-connected companies and to foreign-
funded civil society and international organizations with 
their ideological indoctrination agendas.
Ideological Patchwork or New Texture?
Apart from ideology, a major psychological factor that 
explains the doggedness of the Donbass resistance is 
the expectation that, if Donetsk and Lugansk fall, the 
reaction of the central government, its army and the 
ultra-nationalist paramilitaries will indeed resemble 
the republican repression in the Vendée before and 
after the rebellion was defeated: At least 170,000 civil-
ians and combatants killed in a total area population 
4 On this, see Gilles Lepesant, Entre européanisation et fragmen-
tation, quel modèle de développement pour le territoire ukrainien?. 
Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales, №212, Paris: 
CERI-Sciences po, 2015, p. 20–21.
of some 800,000, ethnic cleansing, the mass drown-
ings of “refractory elements” in Nantes and some 7,000 
post-insurgency death sentences. In that respect, an ele-
ment that arose in the discourse and iconography of 
the Donbass insurgency, are the “42 Martyrs of 2 May.” 
This refers to the pro-Russian demonstrators who died 
in the arson of Odessa’s trade union building in 2014, 
and is often used to point at what will be allegedly in 
store once the “Banderites” reconquer Donbass.
On the whole, Donbass’ resistance identity resem-
bles that which developed over the years in Transnis-
tria, the region which seceded from Moldova in 1990.5 
However, the Transnistrian war which followed in 1992 
in an attempt to retake the territory, lasted for only four 
months and the amount of destruction and the humani-
tarian crisis were far more limited than is the case now 
in southeastern Ukraine. As such, conditions to consol-
idate a proper form of statehood were more favorable 
there. In Donbass, as in Transnistria, separatism and 
international recognition of de facto statehood might not 
even be goals as such. Secession is rather considered to 
be a necessity at least as long as Ukraine is governed by 
what is seen as American vassals, liberals and Banderites. 
The de facto state is also to serve as a “trial field” to put 
the aspired societal and ideological model into practice.
Incorporating Soviet, tsarist and traditionalist Chris-
tian components, the Donbass resistance identity is as 
eclectic as it is paradoxical. It transcends the classical left-
right dichotomy. The “Donbass ideology” also has a cer-
tain international appeal. This can be observed among 
a number of Western European and Latin American 
leftists who are disillusioned in a militant Left, which, 
as one anecdotally put it, is nowadays more concerned 
with transgender rights and festive multiculturalism 
than with the predicament of the working classes. It 
can also be seen among militant rightists hostile to the 
economic neo-liberalism of many of Western Europe’s 
supposedly nationalist parties. A number of volunteers 
from the ranks of these two groups joined the Don-
bass insurgency. Even if its project collapses or is even-
tually defeated in the Donbass itself, the combination 
of leftist and rightist elements will manifest themselves, 
in the lands of the former USSR as well as beyond, in 
more insurgent and opposition movements in the future.
For information about the author and recommended read-
ing see overleaf.
5 For insights on the formation of Transnistria’s “resistance iden-
tity,” see Joris Wagemakers, “National identity in Transnistria: 
a global-historical perspective on the formation and evolution 
of a ‘resistance identity’,” Journal of Eurasian Affairs, 1(2), 2014, 
p. 50–55.
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ANALYSIS
Organic Tradition or Imperial Glory?  
Contradictions and Continuity of Russian Identity Politics
Viatcheslav Morozov, Tartu
Abstract
Russian identity politics and, more broadly, the country’s development in modern times has been condi-
tioned by two constitutive splits: between the imperial elites and the peasant masses, on the one hand, and 
between Russia and Europe, on the other. The current conservative turn aims to overcome the internal 
split by attuning state policy to mass consciousness, with its alleged preference for ‘traditional values’. This 
strategy ignores the fact that today’s Russia is a modern, urbanised society. In the long run, it undermines 
the Kremlin’s effort to achieve and consolidate great power status.
Contemporary Russian identity politics is a  rather peculiar combination of familiar elements. Since 
2012, the official discourse emphasises ‘traditional values’ 
and ‘spiritual bonds’, thus referring to the presumed exist-
ence of a genuine Russian culture and spirit, uncontam-
inated by the centuries of Westernising modernisation. 
At the same time, the Russian state continues to claim 
continuity with its imperial predecessors, which involves 
a civilising mission in relation to its own population as 
well as a claim to the status of great power and to a prom-
inent role in world affairs. The importance of the latter 
dimension was raised by the interventions in Ukraine and 
Syria, while the resulting standoff with the West intensi-
fied the search for a ‘truly Russian’ Self. The attempts to 
artificially fuse the imperial and the traditionalist-nativ-
ist narratives are not entirely unprecedented, but have 
never been particularly successful in the past.
A European Empire vs. the Organic 
Tradition
In order to appreciate the difficulty of bridging differ-
ent identity narratives, historical background is abso-
lutely essential. Russia’s development in modern times 
has been fundamentally conditioned by two consti-
tutive splits: between the imperial elites and the peas-
ant masses, on the one hand, and between Russia and 
Europe, on the other. According to Geoffrey Hosk-
ing, the first split originates in the division between 
the nobility, who had an obligation to serve the crown 
in the army or the bureaucracy, and the taxed popu-
lation. It was introduced by the state in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, but solidified under Peter I, 
who forced the elites to adopt European culture and 
customs. As Alexander Etkind points out, this created 
a deep divide between the Europeanised, ‘shaven’ Rus-
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sians and their ‘bearded’ compatriots, to the extent that 
their relations are best described as those between colo-
nisers and colonised.
These developments were driven largely by foreign 
and security policy considerations. Russia’s territory has 
always been vulnerable to external invaders. The ascent 
of Western Europe, driven by technological and socie-
tal innovation, made Russia feel increasingly exposed 
on that flank, creating incentives for Europeanisation as 
a way of catching up with the most advanced countries. 
However, as Leon Trotsky was first to clearly demon-
strate, the geopolitical ‘whip of external necessity’ did 
not result in a smooth transplantation of ‘progressive’ 
European institutions. Rather, Russia followed a pat-
tern of what Trotsky termed ‘combined development’: 
institutional borrowings were adjusted to the needs of 
a vast empire whose primary task was to control its 
diverse populations and to mobilise resources for the 
continuous military effort.
One could argue that combined development was 
responsible for fact that Russia has never been able to 
fully integrate into the European civilisational space. 
Iver Neumann has argued that in their hegemonic posi-
tion, West Europeans have always been very sensitive to 
the ways in which other countries were governed: Rus-
sia’s authoritarian governance was looked upon with 
suspicion and contempt, and often presented as a threat 
to the entire European liberal order. The reasons for 
this suspicion are easy to reconstruct by following the 
present-day discussion about Moscow’s subversive pol-
icies in relation to Western democracies. This was the 
origin of the second major divide mentioned above, 
between Russia and (the rest of) Europe.
Both splits had constitutive significance for Rus-
sian identity. Essentially, the key identity problem Rus-
sia has faced since the eighteenth century is whether 
to Europeanise further, in the hope of eliminating the 
difference with Europe, or to turn its back to the West 
and rebuild the society around traditional values, with 
the elites abandoning their unnecessarily sophisticated 
culture and embracing a simpler lifestyle of the masses. 
The first option has always been extremely attractive not 
just because of the chance to become fully recognised 
as a European great power, but also as a way to create 
robust institutions rooted in civil society and thus capa-
ble of reigning in the omnipotent, corrupt bureaucracy. 
Yet this was also risky, since grassroots mobilisation 
threatened the integrity of the empire, where ethnic Rus-
sians constituted less than half of the total population. 
Even those ethnic Russians were predominantly peas-
ants, culturally alienated from the elites and believed 
to be unpredictable and prone to rebellion. Finally, the 
elites were also increasingly fragmented: the emergence 
of the democratic intelligentsia by the mid-nineteenth 
century signified a radical challenge to the legitimacy 
of the state and a growing fragmentation of the public 
space into mutually hostile circles and groupings.
The second option—going with the people away 
from Europe—looked safer at first glance but implied 
forsaking or at least postponing social modernisation. 
This inevitably put Russia under Trotsky’s ‘whip of exter-
nal necessity’. Another, subtler but eventually more fatal, 
difficulty consisted in the fact that the people were not 
properly represented in the discursive and political space. 
The peasants were largely illiterate and did not pos-
sess the means to express their ‘traditional values’ in 
a way that would enable their political operationali-
sation. Instead, these values were mostly imagined by 
the intellectuals, and in particular by the great nine-
teenth-century Russian literature. This gap began to 
close down in the early twentieth century, but it cer-
tainly would be an exaggeration to say that we know 
much about the peasants’ view of an ideal society, or, 
indeed, even to claim that peasants shared any compre-
hensive social utopia going any further than contradic-
tory common-sense views.
Viewed against this background, the current turn 
in Russian identity politics might seem to be a repeti-
tion of the old pattern of conservative reaction follow-
ing the most recent round of painful and destabilising 
reforms. However, the current situation is distinct in at 
least one crucial respect.
Traditionalist Identity for a Modern Society?
As pointed out above, imperial Russia was a deeply frac-
tured society, where the distance between the elites and 
the masses was so huge that the state effectively had to 
embark on a civilising—or colonising—mission in rela-
tion to its own population, including ethnic Russians. 
However, the Soviet Union managed to largely complete 
this mission in relation to the imperial core, roughly con-
sisting of the European part of the Russian Federation 
(except for North Caucasus), Belarus, Eastern Ukraine 
and urbanised spaces in Siberia, Kazakhstan and the 
Far East. Social mobility and displacement caused by 
the Soviet modernisation and totalitarian repression lev-
elled legal and cultural barriers between social groups. 
The new hierarchies that came to replace the tsarist ones 
were much less steep; in addition they were again trans-
formed by the Soviet collapse. Most importantly, how-
ever, the Soviets introduced universal standardised sec-
ondary education and developed a mass culture that 
appealed, and was available, to all social strata.
As a result, the post-Soviet Russian society is much 
more homogenous than any of its predecessors. This is 
not to say that there is no inequality or that class dif-
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ferences have no cultural markers. However, when it 
comes to questions of national identity, any two Russians 
would always be able to engage in a conversation and 
they would be using largely the same discursive codes.
It is impossible to imagine such a conversation in the 
nineteenth century between an intellectual and a peas-
ant: when the Russian populists decided to ‘go to the 
people’ in the 1870s, it took a lot of time and effort even 
to begin to establish a common language and the trust 
needed to discuss politics. However, the topics of today’s 
conversation would be largely the same that were dis-
cussed by the nineteenth-century Slavophiles and West-
ernisers, as well as their successors: is Russia a European 
country? Should it try to catch up with the West or go 
its own way? Should it be proud or ashamed of its dif-
ference from Europe?
Hardly anyone in Russia or beyond would deny the 
fact that there continue to exist significant differences 
between Russia and most of the EU-Europe when it 
comes to how the society is governed, the design and 
quality of institutions, certain behavioural patterns and 
so on. This is hardly surprising, given that the country 
has never been able to break away from the vicious cir-
cle of dependent, semi-peripheral development. Stalinist 
modernisation was in this respect a huge leap forward, 
but it was mostly based on imported technology (which 
was exchanged for grain expropriated from the peasants). 
Late Soviet Union developed an oil addiction, which 
became even more acute in the post-Soviet period. The 
state’s reliance on rents rather than taxes distorts popu-
lar representation, undermines democratic accountabil-
ity and produces widespread corruption.
While a majority of political and intellectual leaders 
of contemporary Russia would perhaps agree with the 
diagnosis, most of them stop short of embracing any rad-
ical reform. They do it for the same reason their prede-
cessors did in the nineteenth century: they do not trust 
their own people. There is a fear that grassroots activism, 
unless closely supervised by the state, is prone to result 
in chaos and destruction. This view is sustained by the 
interpretation of the 1990s as a  ‘dark age’ in Russia’s 
recent history, a modern time of troubles, as well as by 
the conspirological idea that the West will use any weak-
ness of the state to stage a ‘colour revolution’ in Moscow.
Thus, instead of talking to the Russian people as 
enlightened peers, the conservative elites prefer to see 
them as nineteenth-century peasants who could and 
should be kept in check through the promotion of Ortho-
dox religion, traditional family and a ‘patriotic’ view or 
history where the tsars and their people stand together in 
some form of spiritual, superhuman unity. Paradoxically, 
the conservatives are being helped by a large majority of 
the liberals, who never tire of deploring the barbarianism 
they see around themselves. Instead of conceptualising 
Russia’s difference in institutional and historicist terms, 
as an outcome of a specific pattern of deferred modern-
isation, Russian Westernisers essentialise this difference 
as a cultural phenomenon, by attributing it to the per-
sistence of ‘peasant consciousness’, ‘Soviet mentality’ or 
‘the authoritarian Russian mind’. From such essential-
ism, there is only one step to supporting the regime as 
something that the Russians actually deserve.
It must be emphasised that while it is the elites who 
determine the course of the country, the identity dis-
course behind those decisions is shared by the entire 
society. In other words, it is not just the leaders who 
do not trust the masses: in a way, the entire Russian 
people do not trust themselves. Everyone is eager to 
repeat the clichés about Russia being a radically, irra-
tionally deviant case. Whether this allegation is taken 
with gloomy pessimism or self-indulging elation is of 
secondary importance. Inter alia, this explains the effec-
tiveness of the official propaganda: it is not that every-
one believes everything the TV tells them to be true, but 
most people would say that some brainwashing is nec-
essary for the sake of disciplining fellow citizens, who 
otherwise might get out of control.
Conclusion
There are limits to the extent to which a modern power 
with a claim to global leadership can engage in attempts 
at persuading its population that they are better off as 
uncivilised natives rather than as modern citizenry. For 
one, embracing spiritual values might be fine as long as 
most people still have access to the benefits of modern 
civilisation, but radical traditionalists are constantly try-
ing to question that. Among the potentially explosive 
issues are the right to abortion or access to modern com-
munication technologies, both of which in different ways 
could seriously affect large segments of the population.
Even more important is the fact that the Russian 
state seems to be at a peak of its international engage-
ment, being involved in the conflicts in Ukraine and 
Syria as well as in the global standoff with the West. 
There is an obvious risk of imperial overstretch not 
unlike those which brought down the Russian empire 
and the Soviet Union. In combination with the struc-
tural economic crisis and a decline in the oil price, this 
means the need to mobilise all available resources. Even-
tually—and this is acknowledged by the authorities—
making Russia great again necessitates an economic and 
technological modernisation.
If modernisation is indeed a necessity, the conserva-
tive turn might be useful for societal mobilisation, but 
its short-term benefits are clearly offset by the backward 
movement in the development of education, health care 
RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 198, 14 February 2017 9
and other key elements of social infrastructure. In other 
words, if the state persists in its promotion of ‘tradi-
tional values’, it will perpetuate the technological and 
institutional gap between Russia and the developed 
world, which will inevitably have consequences in the 
field of foreign policy. The ‘whip of external necessity’ 
is bound to strike again, although it might take time 
before that happens.
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